The latest in nuclear cheating, from Iran to North Korea

The promise of Iran’s denuclearization may be unraveling faster than the promise of North Korea’s denuclearization.

This week, Stratfor published satellite-photo analysis strongly indicating that Iran is moving much of its nuclear activities from sites that the United Nations inspects to “no-go zones” where it may well continue developing nuclear-arms technology.

Wait, but didn’t Secretary of State John Kerry promise the pact he signed with the mullahs last summer “blocks of all Iran’s paths to a nuclear bomb?” And isn’t Iran complying?

Iran indeed took enriched uranium out of its known sites, closed down its plutonium plant — and then concealed whatever it’s doing in the Parchin military complex.

Parchin’s status was contentious during the talks. Our tireless diplomats demanded inspectors’ access there, but Iran contended that its military facilities are non-nuclear, so no inspection necessary. Yet, intelligence reports have raised suspicion that in the past, Iran had tested explosives at the Parchin facility, which can be used for detonating nuclear weapons.

Tehran finally agreed to let the International Atomic Energy Agency have a look-see. Except the inspectors weren’t allowed to visit Parchin’s secretive, deeply-buried parts.

Now Stratfor’s comparison of satellite photos, taken over Parchin in July 2010 and again last month, concludes that those underground facilities are being expanded. Also: The area’s being cleaned up to hide the evidence.

So Iran now has the option of advancing its nuclear-weapons program in secret. And the very inspectors we rely on to assure that the mullahs stick by their deal obligations can do little about it.

Meanwhile, even the deal’s most avid cheerleaders are starting to fret about its failure to address Iran’s missile program — which Iran managed to convince our able diplomats has nothing whatsoever to do with nukes.
Then, soon after the pact was sealed (though never signed), Iran tested long-range missiles capable of carrying nukes.

But who’s counting. This week, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan vowed to further upgrade its advanced Emad ballistic-missile system. He also said Iran will soon begin receiving Russian surface-to-air S300 missiles, which could protect its nuclear facilities from air attacks.

If any of this sounds familiar, it should. In 1994, the Clinton administration signed a deal with North Korea, in which the Kim regime shut down its plutonium-based facility in Yongbyon and opened it for IAEA inspection.

But then two years later it became a nuclear state — one that increasingly threatens its neighbors. And now, with ever-advancing missiles, it threatens others beyond the immediate neighborhood: Over the weekend Kim Jong-un celebrated the approaching Chinese New Year with a launch of a “peaceful” satellite that happens to use missile technology that can reach California.

And to complete the circle, North Korea is once again “expanding its Yongbyon enrichment facility and restarting the plutonium production reactor,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told Congress this week. Yes, that’s the very facility that it sealed when signing that glorious “agreed framework” 22 years ago.

Iran is perfecting this play. Its technicians have been spotted over the years among North Korean officials watching the Norks’ nuclear and missile testing. Iranians, presumably, were also present during this week’s North Korean satellite launch and January’s nuclear test. Iran’s missile program is based on North Korean design and technology.

And now the mullahs have started violating their own agreement obligations.

The UN Security Council is struggling to impose new sanctions on North Korea. In Washington, a bipartisan group of legislators is attempting to punish Iran for its missile launch. In both cases, though, the genie may already be out of the bottle.

Sure, Iran and North Korea are quite different, but as far as our next president is concerned, they should be treated with the same amount of caution: To disarm rogue regimes you can’t solely rely on “airtight” diplomatic deals.

http://nypost.com/2016/02/10/the-latest-in-nuclear-cheating-from-iran-to-north-korea/