Ahmad Shirzad: This May Delay the Implementation of the JCPOA

Rooz Online

The letter that Iran’s leader ayatollah Khamenei sent to president Hassan Rouhani last Wednesday contains conditions that he requires the government to fulfill before his administration starts to implement Iran’s obligations under the July 14 nuclear agreement that was reached between Iran and the 6 major world powers, known as JPOA. These conditions quickly turned into hot political issues in Iran’s news and political circles. Media affiliated with hardliners in Iran and opponents of the administration, and the July 14 nuclear agreement, announced the letter as “the supreme leader confronts pro-Western elements inside the government” while pro-government media have generally factually reported the contents of the letter without commentary. Rooz spoke with Ahmad Shirzad, a member of Iran’s sixth parliament (2000-2004) and a nuclear and political commentator in Tehran about the letter and its importance. Here are the highlights.

Rooz: What are the highlights of ayatollah Khamenei’s recent (last week) letter to president Rouhani on the nuclear issue?

Ahmad Shirzad: There are three parts to the letter, the first is ayatollah Khamenei’s advice and his general views. These comprise his fears and directives to foreign policy decision-makers in the country, and especially the president himself. These include the usual “be watchful of American plots” language because he believes that the US is not sincere in the presentation of its views. But it is important to note his references to two letters that the president of the US had sent to him. He then says the American president had written that the US was not pursuing regime change in Iran (the official English version of the letter on ayatollah Khamenei’s site mentions “subversion.”), implying that the US has continued its mischief against Iran.

Rooz: This is immediately followed with ‘buts’ and ‘ifs’

Shirzad: Yes, the ‘buts’ and ‘ifs’ are injected to say that Iran expects America to be sincere in its claims of pursuing non-subversion in Iran. I think the fact that Khamenei mentions these two letters is important and significant, even though we know that his view of the US is that of doubt and distrust. He has never denied or hidden his views on this. Overall, I think the letter is very pragmatic, even though it presents a pessimistic atmosphere.

Rooz: What about the second part?

Shirzad: The next part are his directives, which are for domestic purposes. For example, he asks that resistance economy be pursued and committees (groups) be formed to track the violations of the other party to the agreement, or that plans should be created and approved by the supreme national security council so that 8 years into the agreement Iran could pursue its goal of having the capacity for 190,000 separative work units (SWUs). These are important but related to domestic issues and do not impact the implementation of the JCPOA now.

Rooz: And the third part?

Shirzad: This part is the most important one but it occupies the least amount of space in the letter. It lists the conditions for Iran’s implementation of its obligations under the JCPOA and the continuation of the agreement which are specifically related to the third and fourth paragraphs.

Rooz: Let’s go over the paragraphs of the letter. The first paragraph says that strong and sufficient guarantees (i.e. arrangements) must be made to prevent violations by the other side which includes the verbal announcements by the president of the US and the European Union about the lifting of sanctions. Mr. Khamenei stresses that the declaration by the EU and the president of the US must explicitly provide for a complete lifting of the sanctions.

Shirzad: Through this section, he is in fact implicitly confirming that the sanctions will not be lifted until Iran completes its necessary actions under the JCPOA, and then he asks for a written commitment. But the commitment he is asking for has already been given. The orders that the president of the US and EU officials have issued contain these provisions, so I do not believe there is an issue with the first paragraph.

Rooz: The second paragraph says that if any sanctions are re-imposed on Iran during the first eight year period for any reason and at any level, these will be viewed as violations of the JCPOA and the government of Iran is required to stop the implementation of the JCPOA if such sanctions are re-imposed. But how can the government provide such a guarantee?

Shirzad: Yes, it is difficult to make predictions on this because nobody knows what future events may occur. At the same time, the talks that Iran had with the P5+1 were over the nuclear issue and no other issues. So what they expect through this is that no new sanctions related to nuclear issues be imposed and in addition, that no new sanctions of any kind or for whatever reason be imposed on Iran. But in response to those who have questioned the lifting of sanctions against Iran, US officials have said in their talks and speeches that only those sanctions that relate to the nuclear issue will be lifted and these do not include sanctions on human rights violations and other issues. Of course Iran did not raise the issue of lifting sanctions related to human rights issues during the nuclear talks because its main concern was the nuclear-related sanctions. The concern in Iran, especially among the hardliners, is that in future, if a Republication won the next or future presidency, he could make human rights a big issue against Iran and impose sanctions that are similar to those of the nuclear-related ones. I think this concern is understandable and justified. Nobody can predict the future and anything can happen. Westerners do not want to tie their own hands against those who may disregard their standards. I do not think anything can be done about this under the current circumstances. Khamenei is setting conditions and warnings and telling the Americans that if in future they pursue policies that pro-Israeli circles pursue, then the JCPOA could be viewed to have been violated.

Rooz: You said paragraphs three, four and five are very important. These sections deal with IAEA’s announcement that Iran has met its requirements under the JCPOA, the conversion of the Arak plant and the export of the stockpiled of enriched uranium. These must be all certified by the IAEA before the sanctions are lifted.

Shirzad: That is correct. There are two or three beautiful and specific issues here. One is that these provisions show that ayatollah Khamenei is aware of the details of the nuclear deal and here he says what needs to be done before each point. In other words, looking at it positively, everything that has been done until now has been under his supervision.

The next point that he makes is that Iran would not implement part three until part four and part five have been implemented. Part four relates to changing the nature of the Arak plant, which is referred to as “renovation.” This means restructuring Arak in a manner that is not threatening to the West and that indicates no military activities take place at it. Westerners expect Iran to start this within two months and complete the transformation. Part five also relates to Iran’s commitment of reducing the volume of its enriched uranium and change the existing stockpile to uranium rods (yellow cake) or to send it abroad. Iranian officials have decided not to change the form of this stockpiled uranium and instead send it abroad – which means Russia – and in return receive fuel (in the form of fuel rods) for its nuclear power plant. On this point, Mr. Khamenei stresses to the government not to send its enriched uranium abroad until it first receives sufficient guarantees to receive fuel rods. This too is not a serious issue because it has been done in the past when a few years ago Russia delivered some fuel rods to Iran. Today the amount of this enriched fuel is of little research quantity and so they will agree to this. The fourth part is not an issue because the US and China have already formed a consortium, as required by JCPOA, to start work on converting the Arak plant.

But the third point that is raised is the most important one which is something that ayatollah Khamenei has stressed and that is that first of all the dossier on the assertions that Iran may have directed its nuclear activities to military use (pursued by the IAEA) needs to be finalized and terminated, thus concluding that Iran’s nuclear program has always been peaceful in nature. In other words, Khamenei says that the IAEA should clear Iran’s record and then it would start work on addressing the other two issues (Arak and enriched uranium).

I think this requirement (IAEA’s issuance of a clean bill on Iran) is the key message and part of this letter.

Rooz: Is the JCPOA under threat?

Shirzad: These issues may postpone the implementation of JCPOA for a short while. Mr. Khamenei’s reasoning for launching these conditions is that if Iran embarks on the irreversible path of reducing the amount of its enriched uranium - or sending this uranium abroad - it will have lost all leverage especially if the IAEA decides to postpone giving Iran’s nuclear program a clean bill of health. In reality he is pointing his finger on a very important issue and at a very adroit moment. This is because we are now at a point where the West has wanted us to be in the last ten years, which is the reduction in the volume of enriched uranium and the conversion of the Arak plant. Now with these conditions, Mr. Khamenei has conditioned the implementation of these two issues to IAEA’s declaration that Iran’s nuclear program has no Possible Military Dimensions (PMD).

http://www.roozonline.com/english/news3/newsitem/archive/2015/october/24/article/ahmad-shirzad-this-may-delay-the-implementation-of-the-jcpoa.html