If North Korea Got the Bomb, Iran Will Too

If North Korea could develop and test a nuclear weapon, even under a stringent arms control regime, why can't Iran also build a bomb under a far less ample nuclear deal?

It seems like we have been here before. In the early 1990s, concerns were growing that North Korea was on the verge of developing nuclear weapons capability. In 1994, the United States and North Korea adopted an agreement called the "Agreed Framework," which called on Pyongyang to freeze and dismantle its nuclear program, place its spent uranium fuel under international control and allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify compliance through "special inspections." In return, North Korea would receive two light water reactors that had no weapons applications, shipments of fuel oil and a promised move toward normalization of political and economic relations.

The Agreed Framework seemed to get off to a good start, but ultimately failed. The International Atomic Energy Agency maintained a presence at the Yongbyon nuclear site to verify compliance, but North Korea and the agency became locked in contentious talks over technical aspects of compliance that made it difficult if not impossible to know if the freeze was actually being implemented. The agency had good reason to be suspicious. Pyongyang had started a secret centrifuge program and was suspected of producing weapons-grade plutonium. As well, North Korea aggressively pursued a ballistic missile program despite the fact that it was disrupting other efforts to normalize relations.

In 2002, North Korea admitted to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs James A. Kelly that it had a program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This was in direct violation of the Agreed Framework, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (which North Korea shortly withdrew from) and other international agreements. The International Atomic Energy Agency, which had been frustrated in its task to verify the freeze, referred the matter to the U.N. Security Council. The Six Party talks followed, which seemed to show some progress in coaxing North Korea back from its dangerous path. But in October 2006, Pyongyang announced it had tested a nuclear weapon. Diplomacy failed.

On its face, the Agreed Framework was a better deal than the proposed P5+1 agreement with Iran. It had a tougher verification regime, promised to remove North Korea's existing nuclear stockpile, and would have fully eliminated the North Korean nuclear program had it been carried out. The P5+1 negotiations – undertaken by the United States, France, the U.K., China, Russia and Germany – have never even considered these objectives vis-à-vis Iran. So whatever the final terms of the deal with Iran are, they will be weaker than the failed agreement with North Korea.

Tehran is in a much better position than Pyongyang was to develop a nuclear weapon even after the deal is signed. Iran has a larger economy and better infrastructure. Iran will reportedly be given a $50 billion no-strings-attached "signing bonus" once a deal is concluded, which could be spent on weapons programs. (By contrast, North Korea had only demanded a $1 billion per year payment for getting rid of its missile program.) And Iran benefits not only from its own cadre of technical experts, but also from the knowledge base of the North Korea's, with whom it has been collaborating for years on nuclear and weapons programs. Iran has the capability to go nuclear even under the current punishing sanctions regime. In an April interview with Charlie Rose, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif admitted that despite sanctions, Tehran had amassed enough nuclear material to build eight nuclear weapons. He said they have not tested a weapon yet because they don't want to. But if they don't want to, why did they amass the nuclear material in the first place?

The Agreed Framework with North Korea promised the same outcomes we are hearing about the nuclear deal with Iran. North Korea was a much weaker country, with a less developed nuclear program, and faced strong terms in the deal with more comprehensive verification. And in the end, North Korea got the bomb. If they can do it, Iran can too, deal or no deal.

http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2015/07/07/north-korea-got-nuclear-weapons-so-iran-can-too