The ultimate fate of Iran nuclear talks

Amid hope and desperation, Iran and the P5+1 world powers (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany, but primarily the US) are striving to complete a comprehensive nuclear agreement by the November 24 deadline.

Nearing the self-imposed deadline, both Americans and Iranians have underlined that as a result of the wide gap between the two sides, “substantial work” remains to be done. But they have also emphasised that they are focused on realising a comprehensive agreement by November 24.

The two sides have declined to officially discuss major stumbling blocks, but there is consensus among experts that the size and scope of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, and the process through which Iran will receive sanctions relief, are the most pressing issues.

The quantity of operational uranium enrichment centrifuges lies at the heart of disagreements between Iran and the world powers. Enriched uranium is a material that can be used for peaceful purposes if enriched at low levels but if enriched at high grades, may also be used for building bombs. The West/US seeks to reduce the number of Iran’s working centrifuges under a final agreement. They want to ensure that if Iran unilaterally leaves the agreement one day in the future, the breakout time towards weaponisation is at least six months and preferably a year, providing sufficient time to coerce Tehran into halting its activities.

Currently, Iran has almost 10,000 operating centrifuges and approximately 10,000 more are installed but not operating. Experts close to the negotiating teams maintain that the United States seeks to reduce the number of operational centrifuges to between 1,300-1,500. The Iranians, insist on a capacity of 10,000 separative work units (SWU), which is equivalent to 10,000 older generation centrifuges currently in use, or fewer advanced centrifuges that will allow the nation to enrich uranium at a faster pace.

Meanwhile, they also insist on the need to increase their number of centrifuges to approximately 190,000 SWU, to produce low-enriched uranium fuel for their Bushehr nuclear power plant by 2021 when the Russians’ contract for supplying fuel for Bushehr expires.

Iran argues that nuclear independence is necessary based on its past experience with foreign countries. It maintains that the limited fuel market for nuclear power plants (enriched uranium) can be easily controlled by the US, and asserts that dependence on foreign sources allows suppliers to either impose humiliating conditions before providing the fuel, or suppress distribution altogether under the US pressure.

Another fundamental disagreement between the two sides is the duration of any comprehensive agreement and removal of sanctions. Sources close to negotiators maintain that the P5+1, led by the US, seek a 10 to 20 year agreement, while Iran wants sanctions lifted within five years, and restrictions on its nuclear programme for no more than five to seven years.

Three possible outcomes

n Scenario 1: Collapse of negotiations

This is the least likely scenario. The White House is unlikely to cease negotiations, given the amount of time and energy President Barack Obama and his diplomats have invested in the diplomatic process, already fighting in several theatres, domestically and internationally, primarily against Israel and its lobby in the US who oppose any deal with the Islamic Republic.

The softening of US diplomatic relations with Iran will remain in history as part of Obama’s legacy and one of his greatest accomplishments.

Meanwhile, the Obama administration, as well as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and his top diplomat, Javad Zarif, know well that if these talks fail, hawks and the powerful pro-Israel faction in the US Congress will immediately assume the case, galloping towards paralysing Iran’s economy by further intensifying sanctions.

The Kirk-Menendez bipartisan bill introduced in December 2013 stipulated the reduction of Iran oil exports to de minimis levels within one year of its enactment. More than 50 per cent of Senators supported the bill, which was finally blocked as a result of Obama threatening its veto if passed.

Logic dictates that in such an eventuality, we would most likely witness the return of radical politics in Iran, as was the case during the time of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Iran and the US will be locked in a vicious circle whereby Tehran would expand its nuclear programme and in return, the US would toughen the sanctions with no end on the horizon.

Many experts contend that with the emergence of the Daesh (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) as a serious threat to the security interests of both Iran and the US, they need to cooperate with each other in combating the extremist group. Especially from the US standpoint, given the chaotic and perilous situation in Syria and Iraq, Obama has too much on his plate to resume sabre rattling in Iran’s direction, the likely outcome of which would culminate in military confrontation. The US top nuclear negotiator, Wendy Sherman, said on October 23 that if the talks end on their November 24 deadline without a deal, “escalation will be the name of the game” and the alternatives would be “quite terrible”.

On the Iranian side, Iran’s Supreme Leader, who after years of uninterrupted opposition to direct talks with Americans, has raised and endorsed the concept of “heroic flexibility” in dealing with the United States, would also be unwilling to allow the negotiations to fall apart. From his change in philosophy, an easier and more peaceful life in Iran has emerged due to relative relief from sanctions.

n Scenario 2: Clinching a comprehensive deal by November 24

“None of the negotiators find [an] extension of talks as appropriate. We share this view ... and we think there is no need to even think about it,” Zarif has said.

As recently as October 15, a senior US official stated that “a deal on Iran’s nuclear programme was still possible by late next month and there were no talks now about extending the deadline”.

This scenario is more likely than the first. However, there are multiple reasons why it may not materialise.

Experts believe that even if all major issues were agreed upon, there would still be numerous technical details to be clearly and objectively negotiated between Iran and the P5+1.

As the saying goes, “The devil is in the details.”

Meanwhile, once an agreement is reached, the American and Iran administrations still must sell the agreement to their respective centres of power as a victory.

The Obama administration has to convince Congress that the agreement will not allow Iran to be a threshold nuclear state.

On the other side of the fence, in Tehran, the conservative camp must be satisfied that Iran has not made concessions on its nuclear achievements.

This is a sensitive, time-consuming process that can hardly be settled by the looming November 24 deadline. Iran’s Supreme Leader has declared this as the country’s red line.

“Nuclear achievements are not going to stop [and] no one has the right to trade them,” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has said repeatedly.

Still, there is one major factor that can magically work in favour of this scenario. The Iranian government and the Obama administration are well aware that if the US elections in November result in a Republican majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives, it would traditionally be pro-Israeli and adopt a hawkish stance on the Islamic Republic.

Less than two weeks before election day, most polls suggest that the Republican Party will take control of the US Congress.

n Scenario 3: Extension of the interim agreement, with addendum

Although an interim agreement falls short of ideal for either side, neither wishes to return to the status quo ante for the reasons discussed in Scenario 1. Both Tehran and Washington have an interest in finding middle ground. From Iran’s perspective, they’re getting relief on the sanctions and finally, international recognition and acceptance for its right to a peaceful nuclear programme. From the US standpoint, they will have been able to roll back Iran’s nuclear programme without sacrificing the structure of the sanctions regime.

Sources have cited major progress on a number of issues including the fate of Iran’s Fordow enrichment facility, the Arak heavy-water reactor, and broader inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These advances may shape a new agreement in exchange for new sanctions relief, added as an annex to the initial interim agreement. Such progress also lends confidence that the overall process is working and increases the likelihood of setting a new deadline for reaching the comprehensive agreement.

Keeping the interim agreement alive, structuring and signing a new deal which resolves critical issues such as the Fordow facility and the Arak reactor, is a monumental leap towards untying this Gordian Knot.

Although this scenario is the most likely, it does involve risks. Delaying a final agreement provides time for opponents of the negotiations, both in Iran and the US, to scuttle talks and overcome the diplomatic process. Will the two administrations sustain resistance to pressure and bring this crisis to an end?

Only time will tell.

Shahir ShahidSaless is a political analyst and freelance journalist writing primarily about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs. He is also the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, published in May 2014. He lives in Canada.

By Shahir ShahidSaless | Special to Gulf News