Hamas has been looking for allies, so far in vain

Haaretz

This week’s conference call among Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas political leader Khaled Meshal and Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shalah raised speculation that the deep rift dividing Hamas from Iran and Hezbollah was being healed, and that Hamas would return to the “Shi’ite bosom” that had nurtured it for decades. Yet it’s doubtful this phone call represented a strategic change in the positions of either side.

While Islamic Jihad remains an Iranian protégé, Hamas decided two and a half years ago to break with Iran and return to its natural Arab and Sunni home. This decision was sparked by the Iranian-backed Syrian government’s slaughter of its largely Sunni citizens, which generated pressure to sever ties from both fellow Palestinians and Arab states. But Hamas also thought this move wouldn’t exact too high an economic price, thanks to the support it received from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood-led government.

That calculation collapsed when Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi was ousted last year; Egypt’s new government is waging war on the Brotherhood and all its branches, first and foremost Hamas. But Hamas can no longer return to Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Qatar and Turkey remain its only refuge, and both are loathed by Egypt and the Gulf states.

Herein lies the most important difference between Hamas and Hezbollah: While Hezbollah receives enormous financial, diplomatic and political support from Iran and Syria, Hamas’ economic pipelines have been blocked. But this in turn reflects another important difference: Hezbollah has strategic regional importance that Iran can’t afford to give up. Its participation in Syria’s civil war has been crucial to the regime’s survival, while its dominance of Lebanese politics blocks the influence of Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It has thereby secured Iran preeminent status in this part of the Middle East.

Hamas, in contrast, has no such regional political influence. It hasn’t even been able to get Hezbollah to join its battles against Israel: Despite Nasrallah’s talk about the Palestinian problem being top priority and his verbal support for “resistance,” his troops have never actually fought on the Palestinians’ behalf; he makes do with providing military aid, training and advice.

Hezbollah sees itself first and foremost as a Lebanese organization working for Lebanese interests; it even justifies its intervention in Syria in those terms. This obligates it to maneuver among Lebanon’s various ethnic and religious communities and take their competing interests into account. Thus it can allow itself to refrain from fighting Israel for long periods without its status in Lebanon being hurt.

The Palestinian population, in contrast, is largely homogenous, and is united behind the struggle against the Israeli occupation. Thus, as long as the occupation continues, Hamas can’t give up the armed struggle, or at least preparation for it during periods of calm. Its national (as opposed to religious) existence and legitimacy depends directly on its fight against the occupation.

Hamas is similar to Hezbollah in its ability to challenge the central government – in its case, the Palestinian Authority. But unlike Hezbollah, Hamas itself faces challenges from other armed organizations in Gaza, like Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees.

Thus, comparisons between Hezbollah and Hamas are liable to be misleading. Take, for instance, the European Union’s call for disarming Hamas, which is modeled after the demand to disarm Hezbollah included in the UN resolution that ended the Second Lebanon War of 2006. Granted, disarmament also failed in Lebanon, but it isn’t even theoretically plausible in Gaza.

Lebanon does have an army subordinate to the civilian government, and Hezbollah even formally recognizes its authority; it merely claims the army is too weak to “protect Lebanon from Israel” without its assistance. Hamas, in contrast, sees itself as Palestine’s army, now that the Palestinian Authority has given up the armed struggle. In its view, any attempt to disarm it would disarm the national resistance, thereby destroying Palestine’s deterrence against Israel and giving up a vital strategic tool for attaining Palestinian sovereignty. And that’s before we’ve even considered the practical feasibility of disarmament.

So anyone seeking a “Lebanese solution” for Gaza will have to adopt a different Lebanese model: that of a large military organization constituting an inseparable part of the government.