Would Ankara go back to Tehran?

TEHRAN, Oct. 23 (MNA) – Ankara would have predicted before that fueling terrorism might not work always for its interests, but that when terrorism in Syria escalated, certain groups would cut Ankara’s interests apart now and then.

The recent exchange of fire between Turkey and terrorist groups in Syria-Turkey borders has an important and clear message to Ahmet Davutoglu’s foreign policy: failure of a strategy.

Davutoglu is an expert foreign policy theoretician, once with an ambition to zero-tension relations with Turkey’s neighbors. Although perhaps Erdogan would not even entertain such possibilities, well attributable to his rather cantankerous disposition, but Davutoglu would well know the implications coming from fighting with DAISH (Islamic Emirate of Iraq and Sham (Syria)).

A while before escalation of Syrian crisis, Turkey had gained some amounts of success in foreign policy through its policy of détente with neighbors. With the outbreak of the crisis, Turkey walked in a track might well be called ‘backing terrorism.’

Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been Turkey’s companions in the track. DAISH, now bearing the scars of heavy battery of Turkish Army artillery, enjoyed Turkish support as recently as 6 months ago. When DAISH fostered an enmity toward some more settled Turkish-backed fighting groups such as Free Syrian Army, it suffered the fire of Turkey’s wrath.

Ankara would have predicted before that fueling terrorism might not work always for its interests, but that when terrorism in Syria escalated, certain groups would cut Ankara’s interests apart now and then, which is now happening and Turkish army has reacted. Turkish officials would well realize that stability in neighbor countries was essentially for their interests.

No country had benefited from crisis and unrest in its neighboring country, and Turkey would not either. Erdogan’s government sought for trouble the days when he sank Turkey in turbulence. Now, Ankara has nothing to lose; in Egypt, its allies have fallen from the power; in Syria, Ankara sees its wishes evaporated, and those ruling the National Opposition Coalition are affiliated with Riyadh; terrorists have emerged in Syria who put Turkish interests in jeopardy; Erdogan has been making castles in air, fleeting as it was created.

With ‘psychological atmosphere’ created around Erdogan’s character, at least in short-run, little change and revamping is predictable in Turkey’s positions. If Erdogan comes some day to such a decision, he will find himself facing favorable options: Erdogan would revive Turkey’s relations with neighbors, who would not desert their friends, thus opening a new path in its foreign policy.

In Syria, Iran demonstrated that it would not desert its friends, especially when they are in grave trouble. However, Riyadh revealed its true face to Turkey, which was Saudi Arabia’s disregard for interests of its friends and allies.

What Erdogan no faces is his own device and definitely, he will be left for his own devices. However, he could find a way out of this stalemate through joining axis comprising Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Iran is a great neighbor for Turkey, with long history of relations and a capability to improve Turkey’s relations with the rest of the Middle East.

There is much doubt as to Erdogan’s policies; but if Turkey releases itself from self-made troubles, it would not find better alternative than Iran.