Iran leveraging its nuclear program to boost regional standing

Haaretz

Could it be that in less than two months, since Hassan Rohani was elected president, Iran has managed to devise a broad and detailed plan meant to change the face of the country's nuclear program?

A Norwegian nuclear expert who is close to the world powers' negotiations with Iran postulated that the Islamic Republic has been holding on to the plan for a while, waiting for the right opportunity to present it. According to the expert, the Iranian decision-making process can be quick when it needs to be, but when it comes to a complex issue that involves a variety of factors, like the nuclear program, reaching a consensus swiftly is difficult.

Could it be that the Iranian plan to thaw relations with the West was hatched under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's rule? It wouldn't be the first time that a plan was put together without the Iranian president being made aware, the nuclear expert said. Especially in light of the fact that Ahmadinejad grew quite unpopular during his second term, and was met with much criticism and even sabotage on the part of Iran's parliament and the country's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The expert further suggested that Khamenei may have been waiting until after the election to pull out the plan.

Regardless of whether the plan was prepared in Khamenei's office or put together in recent weeks, it points to a drastic transition from the idealization of the nuclear program, which was perceived as an inseparable part of the Islamic revolution, to the politicization of the program, making it into a venture that is meant to lift Iran's regional and global standing rather than adding to the country's military might. And once the decision is made, there is no reason for delay. After changing the nature of its rhetoric, Iran continues to dictate the pace of the talks.

Unlike Ahmadinejad's regime, which intentionally dragged out the talks with the P5+1 by prolonging the breaks between rounds, lowering expectations, leveling accusations at the West and insisting on continued uranium enrichment, the current administration can be likened to a train rolling downhill without control of its breaks. The first practical round of talks was barely over when the next round was scheduled for November 6-7, less than a month after the first session.

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Tehran's chief negotiator and the star of this nuclear show, explained that these few weeks are enough time for Western powers to discuss the proposal.

It is likely that the meetings in November will be followed by other sessions set under a very tight schedule. Iran's goal is to end the process within a period of six months to a year. Tehran hopes that it can persuade the West to lift a significant portion of the economic sanctions within three months, which would allow it to begin rehabilitating its economy. Western nations, which are not accustomed to such a fast pace of meetings with Iran, will need to formulate their responses and demands quickly. It is clear to both the Western nations and Iran that any delay could shut the window of opportunity, thus empowering the Iranian opponents of the talks and revive the stifled Israeli threat of a strike.

The details of the proposal presented by Iran in Geneva are yet to be revealed, but the mere demand to hold the talks behind closed doors aims to keep Iranian opponents in the dark. This is meant to allow Rohani to present to the public a finished agreement, should one be reached. That being said, Iranian analysts expect details to emerge soon after the next round of talks in Geneva, especially if Iran manages to secure initial relief from sanctions.

The proposal's technical details, which touch upon the extent of foreign supervision and the restrictions that are to be placed on uranium enrichment, are not detached from the strategy guiding Iran with regard to the world powers. While the West's concerns focus on limiting uranium enrichment and barring Iran from producing nuclear weapons, Iran has a broader vision, which extends beyond bringing an end to the sanctions. Iran is seeking legitimacy for the regime that emerged from the revolution – the same revolution that caused a rift between Iran and the United States, distancing the Islamic Republic from the Arab Middle East and turning it into a pariah, an irrational and dangerous country if only due to the religious nature of its rule.

Iran has already made notable progress in the area. The argument over Iran's rationality has all but disappeared from the diplomatic discourse. The "nation of ayatollahs," which only months ago inspired hallucinations of a toppled regime, has become a state that the West can befriend, a state with which the West can weave new dreams of cooperation. But Iran, which has lifted the boycott imposed by the revolution on the United States, does not see this development as an achievement as it cannot yet be translated into strategic partnerships with Arab countries.

The fears of Arab nations, especially Saudi Arabia, in the face of what they view as reconciliation between the United States and Iran are not unfounded. With American firms searching for new markets, with oil companies wanting to make up for lost time and with the U.S. seeking to put another dent in the Russian hegemony in the Middle East, ties with Iran are the way to go.

Saudi analysts have rushed to brand the United States' support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its hostility toward the military rulers in Egypt as proof of the Americans' true tendencies. Furthermore, they identified the United States' abandonment of the Syrian people as an effort to appease Iran. Such sentiments, which are beginning to affect the policies of some Arab countries, can be counted as yet another achievement by Iran, which is gradually becoming a state that is friendly with global policy makers. Iran won't be quick to let go of this new status, which is likely to strengthen the foundation of the nuclear talks.