Iran will not accept these sanctions – it will respond

guardian.co.uk -- The EU has agreed to impose unprecedented sanctions on Iran. These restrictions prevent further Iranian oil export deals with EU states, provide a July deadline for current deals and freeze the European-based assets and trading capacity of Iran's central bank. This follows new US sanctions that were adopted earlier this month.

While Iran is accustomed to being challenged over its nuclear programme, the scale and likely effect of these new sanctions means that the Iranian regime is unlikely to respond with quiet acceptance. By restricting Iran's sale of oil – the sustaining lifeblood of the regime – the latest sanctions foreshadow a major escalation in tensions.

For Iran's leaders, attaining nuclear power is non-negotiable. From the regime's perspective, a nuclear Iran would effectively guarantee the ongoing Islamic revolution. With nuclear weapons, Iran's clerical leadership believes it would be free to engage in more forceful, overt support for theologically rooted Shia political movements across the region (most obviously, the Lebanese Hezbollah). At the same time, these leaders believe that establishing a nuclear capability would also establish a corollary security umbrella to deter foreign enemies from threatening the regime's existential security.

Linked to the first point, an Iranian nuclear capability would be a huge propaganda coup for the regime. As a nuclear power, the self-asserted masters of Shia theological enlightenment would be able to present themselves as similar masters of scientific intellect. The importance of such a success for the regime's mythology cannot be understated.

It is in this context of Iran's perceived nuclear necessity that the sanctions will operate. In imposing substantial damage to an Iranian economy already deep in crisis, from Iran's perspective, the west is imposing costs (in requiring the cessation of the Iranian nuclear programme) that are impossibly high.

The regime will not give up its nuclear efforts, but neither will it accept an approaching economic implosion.

It is under this consideration that Iran is likely to take action to attempt to alter its current predicament – the objective being to weaken the sanctions and to provide time and space for continued nuclear development. In pursuing this outcome, the regime could adopt a number of different strategies.

First, the regime might attempt to mine the Straits of Hormuz. This possibility has received much media attention in recent weeks but would inevitably represent a major escalatory step on the part of Iran. In the short term, it would cause an immediate spike in oil prices and panic western markets.

However, for all the rhetoric, Iran knows that ultimately it could not maintain a blockade for long. The US navy is simply too powerful. Therefore, in taking this action, Iran could certainly produce a temporary effect, but only at severe military cost. In addition, such action would risk providing Israel with a pretext to launch its own action against Iranian nuclear facilities.

Second, the regime might utilise the Revolutionary Guards to engage in covert action against western interests around the world. While such action would unnerve western markets, it would also risk major retaliation. However, the 1996 attack on the Khobar Towers and the 2007 Karbala raid provide two powerful examples of the regime's enduring willingness to take aggressive (and perceivably risky) steps to pursue its political-security agenda.

Third, the regime might encourage Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon to reinstigate conflict with Israel. Iran might consider such action would serve to consolidate the position of Iran's ally, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, allowing him to distract attention from his domestic repression. Alongside this calculation, the regime might hope that it could play off western fears of a regional war – so increasing the likelihood of a negotiated lessening of international pressure. Again, however, Israel might decide to retaliate directly against the Iranian nuclear programme.

Fourth, the regime might decide to engage in further sabre-rattling in the Gulf area. Such action might follow the form of previous threats or ship charge runs. Iran might consider that in increasing regional tensions (and oil prices) it could exploit potential fractures in the pro-sanctions element of the international community, while mitigating the risk of major American retaliation (as, say, a direct attack would likely incur). Again, however, the Iranian regime would risk appearing weak if the sanctions regime were to remain firm in face of such actions.

Regardless of what action or combination of actions the Iranian regime chooses to take, history and present circumstances suggest that it will be unwilling to tolerate these new restrictions with acquiescence. While Iran's military power is limited, in manipulating the west's fears of the regime as fundamentally irrational and thus capable of highly destructive behaviour, Iran's leaders will hope to weaken the durability of these sanctions while protecting the nuclear power that they so desperately desire.

Ultimately, the Iranian leadership will gamble that its resolve supersedes that of the west.