Mottaki Urged Amadinejad to Chase After Ties With Turkey

Iranian foreign ministry document to president Ahmadineiad listing the advantage for Iran of closer relations with Turkey

On 11 July 2010, Iran's foreign minister Mottaki presented a report requested by President Ahmadinejad on the existing and future advantages to Iran of Turkey’s closer relations with it. That was the first step for signing a strategic agreement between the two countries. The report reportedly listed in detail the findings of checks carried out by the Iranian foreign ministry on the positive political opportunities for Iran given the change in Turkey's policy toward it and toward the international community in the past year or two.

The report included several chapters that indicated the existing and future political, security, economic and religious advantages:

a. Negotiations on Iran's nuclear issue.

b. Iranian-Turkish cooperation in the UN and other international arenas.

c. The struggle against the sanctions.

d. Strengthening economic ties.

e. An energy 'corridor'.

f. Assistance to Hezbollah.

g. Regional cooperation: strengthening mutual friends and weakening mutual rivals.

h. Islam: religious cooperation between Iran and Turkey.

i. assistance to minorities in the various countries.

An examination of the issues that came up in the report regarding the existing and future advantages for Iran from its relations with Turkey confirms the recent information on the closer ties between Iran and Turkey and the way in which Iran views what it perceives as their further positive development. According to the information, the report deals with the following advantages:

A. Negotiations on Iran's nuclear issue. According to the information, Turkey will help Iran gain more political time on the Iranian nuclear program. Iran commended Turkey and Brazil for their cooperation in trying to promote a diplomatic solution for the renewed nuclear fuel deal (the TRR). This attempt led to an agreement signed between the three countries on 17 may2010 in Tehran. Iran believes that the U.S. and western countries, regrettably in its view, caused the agreement to fail. In internal forums, Iranians said that had it not failed, the Turkish-Brazilian initiative may have delayed UN security resolution 1929 of 12 June 2010 imposing further sanctions on Iran.

B. Iranian-Turkish cooperation in the UN and other international arenas. The cooperation will be extended in order to cause further sanctions on Iran to fail. Iran will increase its efforts to maintain Turkey's affront at the failure the nuclear fuel deal in order to continue receiving Turkey's assistance in the UN. Turkey also promised to support Iran against intentions to politically attack it in the international arena on other issues, if necessary.

C. The struggle against the sanctions. Iran intends to use Turkey more than ever and as a replacement for Dubai, for importing goods from Europe via Trabzon port on the Black Sea. Turkey will also replace Dubai in importing dual-use equipment. In addition, Iran and Turkey agreed to carry out financial activity using the Turkish Lira in order to trade less with dollars and Euros to avoid inspection of Iranian activity and bypass the sanctions imposed on Iran. In general, Iran believes that its trade ties, investments and financial deals with Turkey should be extended to diversify the possibilities for dealing with the sanctions, given the U.S. pressure on Dubai to decrease its ties with Iran.

D. Strengthening economic ties continued mutual visits of cabinet ministers dealing with the economy and delegations of businessmen in order to strengthen trade relations between them. The two countries have a preferred trade agreement and a joint trade council, and Iran believes that it is necessary to continue the current trend, and to increase trade to about 20billion dollars a year. In addition, realizing joint projects such as a joint customs area, Turkish investments in petrochemical and steel initiatives in Iran, implementing a memorandum of understanding for the development of the Iranian Pars South gas field signed in 2008 and realizing the agreement signed in October 2009 for the joint construction of a refinery in Iran. Regarding tourism, the Turkish and Iranian tourism ministers decided to increase summer tourism between the countries. The Turkish tourism minister agreed to change the image of many hotels in Antalya and prepare them for Iranian tourists at the expense of western tourists: preparing special prayer halls at the vacation sites, an emphasis on modesty, an Islamic atmosphere, etc.

E. An energy 'corridor'. Iran is making efforts to make sure Turkey does not promote the Nabucco project without it. Many countries and interests are currently involved in this project. As recalled, on 13 July 2009, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria signed an agreement for realizing the Nabucco project, the construction of a gas pipe from the Caspian Seaarea and the Middle East to Europe. Iran was to be the key gas provider for the project by means of a pipe passing through Turkey (apparently, without Iran’s participation the countries involved will find it hard to ensure sufficient gas resources). However, U.S. pressure prevented Iran’s involvement in the project and therefore, EU countries approached central-Asian countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to replace Iran. At the same time, the EU wants to reduce its dependence on Russian gas. Turkey wants to ensure energy sources for itself and to establish its status as a 'corridor' for transporting energy and to strengthen its ties with the EU. In addition, Iran also has oil interests which involve Turkey, such as transporting Iranian oil to ports in the Black Sea and the Middle East.(regarding Iranian imports, Iran currently imports half of the fuel it procures abroad through Turkey).

F. Assistance to Hezbollah. Iran views as highly important expanding its military assistance to Hezbollah and increasing Turkey's participation in this issue. In recent years, Iran told Turkey several times that it viewed appositive Turkey's turning a blind eye to weapon smuggling to Hezbollah through its territory. It also mentioned Turkey's positive attitude to Hezbollah, evident in the invitation issued on 20 June 2010 by Ali Babajan, Turkey's deputy prime minister who is also responsible for the economy, to Hezbollah Secretary General, Nasrallah, to visit Turkey.

G. Regional cooperation: strengthening mutual friends such as Syria and Iraq as well as Hezbollah and Hamas, which Turkey has already proven its support for, as well as weakening mutual pro-western rivals such as Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. A key problematic arena for Iran is the Gulf. Iran’s considering ways to apply the political support it receives from Turkey to disputes between Iran and various Gulf countries, such as receiving Turkish support regarding the UAE islands controlled by Iran. This issue is raised from time to time by the UAE and its allies in the Gulf and in Europe. The Gulf countries also support the international community in objecting to Iran’s nuclear program and they support the sanctions imposed on Iran. There is media activity in the Gulf countries against Iran, and harassment of Iranian citizens in the UAE and in Saudi Arabia during the Hajj periods.

H. Islam: religious cooperation between Iran and Turkey, the two non-Arab Muslim countries, in their quest to conquer the Arab Muslim arena. It was learned on this issue that Iran wants to find ways to prevent the two countries from 'stepping on each other's toes' in this cooperation process. Iran believes that it will get Turkey's cooperation on this issue because Turkey also wants to improve its status and ties in the Arab and Muslim world.

I. Assistance to minorities in the various countries. In the past information which came up, Iran was embracing various minorities and Islamic groups around the world operating against the central rule. In the past year it was learned that Iran was becoming increasingly interested in the Uyghur minority in china and in assisting it. According to this information, Iran will urge Turkey to complete a process started by the two countries about a year ago for coordinating the division of their activity among the Uyghur minority in china. According to what Turkey and Iran discussed, Iran will be responsible for strengthening jihad ideology among the Uyghur minority and providing it with military assistance, while Turkey will enable Uyghur operatives to pass through its territory on the way to train in Tehran, and will provide a safe haven for Uyghur operatives wanted by the Chinese authorities.

As for the report, there were several comments in its preface:

A. Satisfaction with the fact that Iran has managed to 'recruit' Turkey to the Iranian-Syrian axis, which will soon include Lebanon and Iraq, according to the Iranian plan.

B. Secret military and economic agreements between Iran and Turkey will be presented to the president in a separate report.

C. Intelligence cooperation agreements between Iran and Turkey are not included in this report since the president ordered the MOIS to write a report on these agreements.

D. A separate report will be written on the areas in which Iran will offer Turkey benefits and preferences. This report will present the advantages to Turkey, and the ways to maintain Iran's attractiveness to Turkey and prevent its return to the western world. It was learned that president Ahmadinejad told Mottaki several days later that he had read the report and intended to ask several ministries to write memos, each ministry in its own field, listing plans for these issues and ways to continue realizing the potential stemming from closer ties between Turkey and Iran.